24th Canadian Field Ambulance
Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps
Report on Operations

23 April 1945
Editor's Note:   This page contains an ex­cerpt from the Re­port on Oper­ations of the 24th Cana­dian Field Ambu­lance of the Royal Cana­dian Army Med­ical Corps for the period 1945 March 25 to April 18.  Ma­ter­ial not rele­vant to the bat­tle of Ot­ter­loo has been omit­ted. Mi­nor spel­ling and punc­tua­tion er­rors have been cor­rec­ted and large num­bers of ab­bre­via­tions and ac­ro­nyms have been spel­led out.  The con­ven­tion of using full cap­ital let­ters for place names has not been fol­lowed here.  This re­port was signed by Ma­jor W.M.G. Wilson, the act­ing com­mand­ing offi­cer of the unit.  This trans­crip­tion was made from a photo­graph of the ori­ginal re­port loca­ted at Lib­rary and Arch­ives Ca­nada and con­tained in box 10941 of re­cord group 24. 

Special Incidents or Problems
The period is noteworthy for the never-​to-​be-​forgotten battle of Otterloo on the night of -​.  The advanced dressing station was open in Otterloo and was cut off for nearly seven hours.  Despite the fact that the battle raged around the very doors at times, the unit functioned efficiently and casualties were admitted, treated, and evacuated without any serious delays.  Casualties reached surgery in Arnhem in almost record time and in correspondingly good condition, due to reaching the advanced dressing station within a few minutes of wounding.  No special problem was encountered during the period.
Lessons learned during the period include the necessity for alertness against attack at all times and for a definite plan of defence in each location.  This should include liaison with nearby units to prepare a co-​ordinated plan.  The importance of each man and non-commissioned officer knowing his job was borne out as was the value of training and good leadership.  Most of the unit's efficiency during this hazardous and most unusual period was due to good work by old-​timer non-​commissioned officers and men.  Also carriers fitted for stretchers at the regimental-​medical-​officer level again proved their worth.  The regimental aid posts which evacuated most of the casualties to the advanced dressing station had three and, but for these, wounded personnel would almost certainly have been re-​wounded during the trip.  No other suggestions regarding equipment or supplies et cetera are made as, once again, these proved adequate.